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The purposes of this paper are to examine the relationship between Japanese foreign direct
investment (FDI) and Japanese exports to China sínce the Open Door Policy , and to make
some observations about Chinese expectations for and assessment of Japanese technology
transfera l. Multiple regression analysis is carried out and it is found that in most sectors , FDI
啞巴竺旦旦 influenci ng factor on exports. In thc 1980s it appears that Japanese investors were
most interested in producing goods for export , but in the 1990s, they have become more
interested in selling their products to the Chinese marke t. The Chinese Government had
hoped that all foreign investors would bring their latest technologies , but Jnany Chinese people
believe that Japanese investors have not been doing so, and an independent survey carried out
in 1985 supports th1 S belie f. Japanese investors are not unique in delaying the transfer oftheir
technologies. However, in recent years export growth has declined, while FDI growth has
risen. This would seem to infer that China will gain fronl lnore and a wider variety of
technology.

Introduction
A considerable amount has been written since the 1960s about the relationship between
foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade. Attention has focused on identifying and
distinguishing the particular factors motivating foreign direct investment from those of
exporting , and on understanding the relative timing of each (Chenery , 1960; Linnen1ann ,
1966; Hymer , 1976; Kojima 1973; Lipsey and Weis丸 1981 & 1984 , etc.). The specific
purposes of this paper are to gain a better understanding 雪 using statistical techniques , of the
relationship between Japanese FDI and Japanese exports to China since the beginning of
China's Open Door Policy , and to COlllment generally on Chinese expectatiolls for and
assessment of Japanese technology transfera l.
While a great deal of descriptive material has been wrÏtten about Japanese economic
relations with Chjna in general (Campbell , 1987; Howe , 1990; Taylc汀 ， 1993) , there seems to
have been very little theoretical research on Japanese trade and FDI to China. Kojima (1 978)
and Ozawa (1 979) have carefu l1 y surveyed and analysed total Japanese FDI around the world.
y okoi (1990) and Ono (1992) have discussed the relationship between investment and trade
in China alone, but have not employed a statistical mode l. Kinoshita (1995) only makes
casual observations about the detenninants of Japanese FDI in China" The Sumitomo Life
Insurance Research Institute (1989) appears to have published a short theoretical piece , but
it was not available to the autho r. A Chinese econonlist , Zhang Zhaoyang (1 995) , has
employed statistical techniques to test the relationship between trade and investrnent in China,
but his is a general study encompassing all of China's lllain trade partners.

Trends in

Ja口anes~E主旦旦旦乏主o

China

PiPl哩竺ic relatiQns between J apan and China were normalized in 1972. After that
date a number of trad且更堅即 llts_ were signed !eading up to enormous C0111n1it且也1s-lmder
亟百副刊同諾言and Friendship and Long Term Trade Agreement in 1978. Under this
agreement Japan was to export vv' hole plants , and the relevant technolog)心 co些竺些且on
materials and equipment in exchange mainly for oil and coa l. At the beginning of the study
interval , 1980 , China was relying on Japan for the largest share of Îts imports. At that time
Jap豆豆3三品unted for 26 .40/0 of the total , followed by the United States with 19.6% and Hong
Kong and Macao with 2.90/0 .
1\"
Ovεr

the past decade and a half, China has reduced its dependency on Japan.
According to the most recent data available , out oftotal imp Q!ts in 199手 22.8~/o came 台om
Èpa丸 )2.2% fron1 Taiwan , 12.1 % from the United States and 8.3 0/0 from Hong Kong and
Macao : The trade relationship is far from balanced. China depends Jnuch ~金主豆豆且Japan as
an e妞2~t ~_ark~t than Japan depends on China. Out of all of Japan's expo肘， 3.9%w哩t to
China in 1980 and 4.8 0/0 in 1993. In 1980 ~ 20.1 % of Chin 的 exports w叫 to Japan，且ι
17.8 0/0 in 1994.
The growth rate of Japanese exports to China has not been steady. (See Table 1.) By
1984 , household incolne levels were increasing sharply and , concomitantly , the demand for
imported consumer goods. Di s astrous旬 ， at the san1e time , however , China' s supplies of
foreign exchange were dwindling at a rapid rate. One cause was the decentralization of

Tab1e 1:

Annua1 Real Growth Ratesof Japanese Exports and Manufacturing FDI to
China 1981-1994 (%)
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1981

-6.75

108.78

1982

-28.69

-19.39

1983

38.94

-84.67

1984

45.70

2 ,860.52

1985

74.74

-11 .4 9

1986

-31 .4 6

68.14

1987

-22.62

379.69

1988

6.98

-78.50

1989

-9.15

56.53

1990

-28.69

-17.65

1991

38.22

52.71

1992

37.29

75.25

1993

40.37

40.86

1994

4.75

4 1. 88

Sources: Calculated from data faxed from the Japanese Ministry of Finance and from the
Japanese Economic Yearbook (various years).
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control over foreign exchange which was leading alarmingly to the total depletion of the
country's foreign reserves. Secondly , the oil deposits in the northeast of China were producing
far short of initial expectations. This was a very serious setback for the country's economic
reforms. 1n the ear1 y 1980s oil had been the largest source of foreign exchange and it was
hoped that oil sales would pay for most of China' s Ìlnports for many years to come , much as
they had for several 孔1iddle Eastern countries.
Thus in 1985 the government had to take drastic measures to curtail the flow of imports
into the country. In addition to the shortfall in northeast oil production there were other factors
In 1985 anti-Japanese
putting downward pressure on imports of Japanese goods.
demonstrations staged by Chinese university students called for an end to the Japanese
"invasion". They believed that the Japanese were providing only low technology to China and
were discriminating against Chinese products , making it impossible to reduce the trade surplus.
1n July 1986 the yuan was depreciated in an attempt to reduce the propensity to import ,
especially from Japan , with whom China had a very large defici t. The almost concurrent
appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accords was yet another factor as was the June 4th
1ncident, though the effects of this were short-livεd. Total exports in 1990 were about half
what they were in 1985 , but rose steadily thereafter. The average real growth rate between
1991 and 1993 was about 39% , but fell sharply to only 4.75 0/0 in 1994.
The percentage breakdown of the exports since 1980 given in Table 2 shows that they
have been consistently dominated by he~ chemical and industrial products. Of this , iron and
steel products and general machinery were the largest sub-categories. However , there were
notable shifts. Iron and steel products went from accounting for 27.0% of total exports in 1980
to only 12 0/0 in 1994 , while electrical machinery rose from 9.5% in 1980 to 2 1. 80/0 in 1994.
Transportation equipment went from 8.2% in 1980 up to 17.60/0 in 1985 , and down to 10.60/0
in 1994. Of the light industrial products , textile products was the largest sub-category and its
share fluctuated from 7.9% to 3.8 0/0 to 9.7%.
\

Trends in J apanese F oreign Direct Investment in China
Since 1960 , the governmen t' s insistence on economic independence precluded virtually
all FDI to China from Japan , or from any other country. In 1983 , by far the largest proportion
of China' s total actually used FDI , 51.6 0/0 , came from Hong Kong and Macao. Japan came
next with 20 .40/0 and the United States a distant third with 9.1 0/0 . It must be pointed out that
due to tense political relations , at the beginning of the study interval Taiwan was investing in
China indirectly through Hong Kong 世 but in the late 1980s there was direct investment. By
1994 , Japan's portion had fallen to fourth place with only 6.1 %, Hong Kong and Macao's
increased to 59.9 0/0 , Taiwan ranked second with 10.0% and the United States was third with
7.3%. Part of the very large proportion from Hong Kong and Macao is actually Mainland
money. Though no figures are available , it is well known that many Mainland investors have
set up front companies in Hong Kong to make use of the special investment terms granted to
foreign investors.
As a proportion of wo r1 dwide Japanese lnanufacturing FDI , the amount destined for
China has been very smal l. It went from 1. 1% in 1983 to 1. 0 in 1990 , then climbed to 4.5%
in 1994. To give perspective , 41.3 0/0 went to the United States in 1990 多 29.7% to Europe , 5.2%
3

Table 2: Percentage Breakdown of Japanese Exports to China

1985

1994

0.2

0.3

0.5

0.7

2.8

12.2

7.1

15.2

7.9

3.8

9.7

1980

neg

F oodstuffs
Raw Materials & Fuel s
Light lndustrial Products
Textile Products
Other Light lndustrial Products

3.6

Heavv Chemical& lndustrial
Products
ChemicaIs

86.1

9 1. 0

80.8

10.7

5.7

7.3

扎1etals

33.1

28.3

14.5

27.0
1. 1

25.6
1. 3

12.0

5.0

1.4

42 .3

57.0

59.0

23.1

16.5

25.0

Electrical Machinery

9.5

20.6

2 1. 8

Transportation Equipment

8.2

17.6

10.6

Precision lnstrunlents

1. 6

2.2

l. 5

lron & Steel
Nonferrous Mctals
Metal Products '
Machinerv &

Equi 口nlent

General Machinery

Source:
Note:

0.9

--...

fo

Ministry of International Trade and lnd的try. (1980-1995) White Papers on
lnternational Trade. Tokyo.
"_" means there was nothing reported for that category. Some category groupings
changed over the interva1. Category contents do not necessarily sum up. Only subcategones are glven.
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to the NIEs , and 13 .1% to the ASEAN cowltries. The figures for 1994 were 33.2 0/0 , 13.5 0/0 ,
6.1 % and 16.3% respectively (JETRO 、 1994 ， 18). Compared to other countries , the
proportion of Japan's tota1 FD1 devoted to lllanufacturing in China has been small , while the
proportion devoted to service industries such as real estate , conlmerce and construction , has
been 1arge.
Table 3 gives the breakdown of Japanese manufacturing FD1 in China from 1980 to
1994. During the first four years of the Open Door Policy , investnlent was limited to only
two or three sectors. 1n 1980 , 73% of the investment was devoted to the electrical machinery
sector wÏth the relnainder going to the chelnical secto r. 1n the following year , 88% went to
the chemical sector with the rest devoted to wood products 勻 and in 1983 chemicals and wood
were again the largest sectors. With little in the way of natural resources of its own, Japan
was keen to develop these industries to maintain its own rate of economic growth.
By 1984 the Japanese had begun to invest in the full range of manufacturing industries ,
including textiles , non-ferrous metal products , general lnachinery , transportation equipment,
etc. Changes in the dominant sector of investment over the period reflect changing Japanese
priorities. 1n 1984 ~ the largest proportion , almost 50 0/0 , was in food products. The main
sector was chelnicals in 1985 and 1986, electrical machinery in 1987 世 1988 and 1989 , general
machinery in 1990 , and electrical machinery again from 1991 to 1994. Obviously there was
keen interest in developing China's electrical machinery secto r. Not only was it the recipient
of the largest investment for much of the period , but its relative proportion was often
considerably higher than the second largest category , which for most years was textiles.
Looking at year-on-year trends , it can be seen that after 1984 the relative importance
of the foodstuffs sector steadily declined. After an initial spurt, investment in wood products
was quite limited after 1983 , and investnlent in chemical products dropped sharply in 1984
and again in 1987. Generally speaking , the trend was upward for textiles , non-ferrous metal
products , transportation machinery , and especially for electrical machinery.
The overall trend in total FDI for the period was upward , but yearly increments v/ere
markedly uneven. (See Table 1) Between 1979 and 1981 when the Chinese government was
trying to do too much too fast , and oil revenues did not reach anticipated levels , there were
alarming investment reversals. 1n a11 , about 300 agreements were withdrawn or postponed ,
including several ln句 or projects such as Phase n of the Baoshan Steel Complex. Japanese
investors were the n10st affected. 1n 1983 a tax treaty was signed b 巳twe e n the two countries
preventing double taxatioll. This was a major factor causing the huge influx of investment
in 1984. After the sharp 乳ppreciation in the yen in the mid-1980s many firms in Japan 10st
their competitive edge and scratnb1ed to continue production in China where costs were much
less. The increase in 1986 was due in part to the Chinese Government' s enacting of the
"Provision of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of
the Foreign 1nvestment刊， offering investors a variety of new incentives. 1n 1988 several
events occurred which stimulated investlnent in 1989: more coastal areas were designated as
special zones for investment , the Japanese goverrnnent extended a third yen credit to China
and the two countries signed a treaty protecting Japanese investors.
1nvestment in 1990 fell somewhat due to the June 4th lncident the previous year , as
well as to the governm ent' s policies to control in f1 ation. However , fr0 0.1 1991 to 1994 , there
5
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(2)
1982

l ‘ 235

1983

598

(0)

10 ‘ 065

1985

4, 162

(0)

1986

2 ,857

1987

2, 530

1988

9.535

1989

7.958

1990

5,738

199 1

11.1 26

1992

16,290

199 3

33 .2 11

1994

60.506

602

650
(5)

( 14)

9.3 49

2,263

69 1

892

(6)

(20)

857

13 ,392
(40)

(~

( 187)

(35)
11 5,2 39
154 ,23 6
406 ,437

(26)
46.682

~

(29)
(38)

lJ5 )

(26)
291 ,306

(1 26)

Table 3: Breakdown of Japanese FDI in China 1980-1994 (Real U.S . Do l1 ars)
Note: The number in parentheses are the number of projects
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(63)
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(69)

(579)
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128 ,217

173 , 859

(38 1)

(6 1)

(20)

(66)
73 1,915

362 , 543

107‘ 125

104, 189

(178)

(33)

(9)

(57)
228 , 596

(1 13)
181 ,557

98 , 552

4 1. 27 1

(85)
102 ,863

(29)

(2)

(34)

(46)

(1 5)

20 , 942

18,206

165 , 11 7

60.706

165 .570

149,623
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73 ,674

(1 8)

(5)
36 ,202
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39 ,721
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19, 52 1
(2)

(22)
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(2)

5, 100

105 ,7 16

(58)
118 ,362

24 ,743

866
( 11 )

(5)

( 13)

( 18)

(2 )

(14)

72 ,613

28.119

16 , 189

47,475
(20)

(283 )

(30)

(1 94)

(5)

4,656

(1 1)

(6)
10.829

2 1.357
(247)

(39)

163 ,978

(1)
1,820

17.096

17 ,399

745

14. 169
(6)
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6步 706

6.296
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4,382
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3,266
(2)

(8)

( 11 )

( 4)

(2)

2.208
(4)

594

1,303
(2)

(3)

1,604

3, 85 5

395

2,46 1

1,015

2,957
(6)

(2)

(5)

(1 1)

4.547

904

1, 106

(3)
1, 562

(1)
1. 461

(1 )

(4)

(9)

208

340

1,236

(3)
3, 597

(0)

756
(2)

1984

198

2 , 164
(3)

3,944

2,548 , 580
(353)
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were notable increases and the Japanese were obviously becoming more keen on China as a
destination for FD I. Amongst factors affecting FDI were the détente between the United
States and the former Soviet Union. Japan's fears of weakening its security commitments
with the United States by pursuing closer economic ties with China largely disappeared.
Although Japan' s economic "bubble" burst in 1991 and total FDI worldwide fell sharply ,
China' s share actually increased. The average real growth rate of FDI to China was about
53% between 1991 and 1994.
Table 4 gives the average value of the Japanese investment projects in China
in real terms. Generally speaking , the value of the projects (total FDI in a given year divided
by the number of projects) increased by a factor of four or five. This would seem to indicate
that as tÍlne went on the Japanese were gaI nlng confidence in the Chinese business
environment and willing to commit larger and larger sums. However , compared to the
investment projects in the United States and other parts of Asia , the projects in China were
still very small (Ono , 1992 型 25-26).
There are several ways direct investment can take place in China: equity joint ventures ,
contractual joint ventures , wholly foreign-owned enterprises , joint extraction and joint
development (of natural resources) , compensation trade , and processing and assembling
agreements. The largest amount of Japanese investment has been in the form of equity joint
ventures. The next largest has been about equally apportioned between contractual joint
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
Most Japanese investment in the early 1980s went to the northeast , especially Liaoning ,
and Shandong , where the Japanese before World War II had held power in what was known
as Manchur間， and to Shanghai which had been the largest commercial centre. In the 1990s ,
by far the largest alTIOunts were going to Shanghai , followed by Guangdong , Lioaning , Beijing
and Jiangsu. Electric and electronic companies chose mainly Da1ian in Liaoning Province ,
Beijing , Shanghai , Guangdong , Jiangsu , Zhenjiang and Xian. Textile enterprises have
favoured Jiangsu , Zhejiang , Shandong and Shanghai (Kinoshita , 1995 , 15-16).

The Relationship Between Japanese

Ex口 orts

and FD1 in China

In order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between Japanese exports
and FDI to China, a series of mu 1tiple regressions was run. The dependent variable was
exports , while FDI and various other factors were the independent variables. For the sake of
consistency , all data was from the Japanese Ministry of Finance and it was all converted into
real Alnerican dollars.
As the period under study is only fifteen years , and in many sectors there was little
or no FDI during the first three years , the available data is not ideal for the employment of
computer statistical techniques. It could be argued that it is apparent just from scanning the
figures that FDI from year to year was highly erratic and did not seem to bear any relation
to exports. However , it was thought that use of a mu 1tiple regression model might reveal the
relative influence of FDI and other factors on trends in exports.
Another difficu 1ty with the data (confirmed by a fax communication with an official
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μ986

1987
1988
1989
1990
199 1
1992
1993
1994
tot31

Cherrlical
Products

Non-Ferrous
Metal
Products

General
Machinelγ

446
1,730

1980
1981
1982
1984
1985

Wood
Products

Electricl
Electronic
Products
1,2 35

Transportation
Machinery

484

412
299
1, 118
378
204
230
477
1. 326
717
1,011
465
852
2β17

845

309
22 1
130
308
406
30
335
474
357
467
545
446

452
30 1
198
377
297
286
623
364
1,068
931
670

340
758
964
408
626
641
1. 242
1049
602
1,826
2 , 593
1. 301

Others

487
739
1,604
804
730
747
1. 107
610
1,245
1,370
1, 939
1,314

508
368
927
346
638
4.331
5,336
3.4 19
1,4 80
2,476
2.335
2, 190

Table 4: Average Value of Japanese FDI Projects in China (Real U.S. Dollars)
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652
405
1, 125
2 , 583
3,937
3.535
1,288
3,3 01
3,1 09
2 ,897
3 ,464
3.012

198

1,444
373
433
2 ,550
2,023
2,064
3,593
2,512

208
730
325
304
343
725
1,650
673
629
1 、 6 16

1,1 28
2 、 03 5

1,217

Total
841
1, 315
1,l 99
521
680
431
445
793
1,012
1427
910
1,020
952
1, 182
1,544
1, 159

of the Ministry of Finance May 1996) was that the FDI categories used by the Ministry are
111uch less precise than the export categories , i.e. , there is an "electrical machinery" category
for FDI , while the export data is subdivided into electrical circuit articles , television sets ,
colour television sets , videotape recorders , communication equipment and other electrical
manufactures. This meant that the sectoral regressions were a11 rather wide. It would have
been preferable to measure the relationship of exports and Fl)I by specific type of
manufactured item , such as exports of television sets with FDI in the m.anufacture of
television sets , instead of regressing the electrical machinery data as a whole.
As the FDI data was so lin1ited it was imperative to use on ly a small number of
independent variabl的。 Real GDP was used to represent growth of the economy , real GDP
per capita was used to represent growih in spending power of the population , and retail sales
(total and by sector) was used to represent buying propensity. Capital construction investment
was used in some of the regressions to represent general infrastructural development of the
economy. All of the independent variables were lagged by one year. lt seelned logical , no
matter what effect FDI had on trade , that it did not occur s Î1nultaneously with exports , but
rather was delayed somevvhat. lndeed this procedure improved the results. A dUlnmy variable
was inserted initially to offset the effects of the June 4th lncident , but was dropped as it
rendered a11 results insignificant. The yearly variations in the data were such that it was
unnecessary to cornpensate statistically for the fall in exports and in vestment following the
lnciden t. The estimation equation was set up in the following form:
log X t =α。 +α1 logFDl t _1 +α2 GDP t_1 +α3GDPpct_l
+α410gINVt_l +α510gRET A1Lt_l +α6 TREND +εl

where :
Exports (total 0τparticular sector)
Foreign Direct Inves t1nent (total or particular sector)
Gross Donlcstic Product Laggcd By One Year
Gross DOlnestic Product Per Capita Lagged By One Year
Capital Construction lnvestment Lagged B y One Year
Retail Sales (total or partlcular sector) Lagged By One Year

X

FDI
GDP t-l
GDPpc t _l
lNV t-l
RETAIL t-l

The en1pirical results were as fo11o\\'s:
(Below the coefficient estimat郎， in parentheses , are their t statistics.)

Total 恥1anufafl旦r!旦g Ex口 orts

log

~

= 29.6814 + 0.0019 logFDl t - 0.0286 GDP叫
(9 .4 64)
(1. 219)
(-8.040)

+0 .4 168 GDPpct_l -1. 8872 logRET AIL t _1+ 0.0653 TREND
(1 3.943)
(-4.529)
(2.422)
R2 - adjusted = 0.9574

F = 41 .4 575

D.W. = 2.6265
9

S.E. = 0.0711

These results indicate that total manufacturing exports were in f1 uenced by the growth of the
economy , spending power of the population and retail sales of manufactured goods. However ,
the coefficient for the FDI variable was insignificant , indicating that FDI had no influence on
exports. The Durbin Watson statistic indicated an absence of first-order serial autocorrelation.

Textile Products Exports
log Xt = 24.1103 + 0.023610gFDl t _1 - 0.0]89 GDP t _1
(4 .4 82) (0 .4 01)
(-2.173)
+0.2909 GNPpc t _l - 2.0689 logRETAIL t _1+ 0.1408TREND
(3 .4 82)
(-2 .300)
(3.030)
R 2 - adjusted = 0.9147

F 二 20.3114

D.W. = 1. 9892

S.E. = O. 1253

The structure of the results for textile exports was the Sa1ne as for total manufacturing exports.
They were in f1 uenced by the growth of the economy , spending power of the population , and
retail sales of clothes , but not FDI. The coefficient for the FDI variable was the only one
which was not significant at the 5% leve 1. The signs were also identical and there was no
autocorrelation.

Electrical 孔1achinerv Ex口 orts

log

X

t

二

18 .4 866

+ 0.077910gFDl t _1 - 0.0244 GDP t-1
(1 4.842) (1. 374)
(-4 .569)

+ 0.2616 GDPpc t _1 - 1. 0230 logRETAIL t _1+ 0.0694 TREND
(5 .235)
(-4.057)
(2 .834)
R2 - adjusted = 0.9138

D.W. = 2.6475

F = 20.0888

S.E. = 0.1056

The structure of the results for electrical machinery was identical to the above two cases.

Nonferrous Metal Products Exports
log Xt =10 .4 835 + 0.1810 logFDl t _1 - 0.0180 GDP t _1
(1 3.033) ( 1. 145)
(-2.522)
+0.2658 GDPpc t _1 + 0.0014 logINV t _1 - 0.1511 TREND
(2.654)
(2.525)
(-2 .945)
R 2 - adjusted = 0.8906

D.W. = 2.6081

F = 15.6508

S.E. = O. 1346

Nonferrous metal products exports were also not inf1 uenced by FD I. The factors which did
influence exports were the same as in the above sectors , but instead of retail sales , the best
AU

--EEA

results were obtained using the capital construction investment variable. This is logical as
nonferrous metal products are used in construction and building. There was no autocorrelation.

Transportation

Equi口ment Ex口 orts

logXt = 2 1. 4793 - 0.0437 logFDl t _1 + 0.0555 GDPt_1
(38.003)
(-1. 318)
(29 .4 22)
+0.0052 logINV t-1 - 1. 2250 TREND
(-18.133)
(25 .4 09)
D.W. 二 2.7681

R2 - adjusted = 0.9996

F = 2995.7563

S.E. = 0.0147

The results for transportation equipment exports indicate that they were not influenced by
investment in transportation equipment. They wer巴， however , influenced by the growth of the
economy and capital construction investment. There was no autocorrelation.

General Machinerv

Ex口orts

logX t =13.0302 + 0.028410gFDl t _1 + 0.1881GDPpc t _1
(1 8.756) (0.223)
(3.591)
+ 0.0013 logINV t _1 - 0 .4 012 TREND
(2.507)
(-2.959)
R 2 - adjusted = 0.7538

D.W. = 2.801

F = 7.8892

S.E.= 0.2127

General machinery exports were also not in f1 uenced by investment in the same secto r. Like
transportation equipment they were influenced by capital construction investment , but instead
of growth of the economy , the other independent variable was spending power of the
population. All signs were positive , and there was no autocorrelation.

Food Products Exports
logX

t

二

-27.0230 十 0.5309

(-9.381)

logFDl t _1 + 0.0573 GDP t _1
(11. 190)
(13.974)

- 0.3800 GDPpct _1 + O. 0009 logINV t _1 + 4.8287 RETAIL t _1
(1 2.740)
(-10.303)
(8.909)
- 0 .4 548 TREND
( -13.943 )
R 2 - adjusted = 0.9786

F = 69 .4 350

D.W. = 2.6540
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S.E.=0.0319

The situation for food products exports was different in that they were influenced by FD I. The
coefficient for FDI was positive and significant, implying a complementary relationship. The
growth ofthe economy, spending power of the population , capital construction investment, and
retail sales of food also influenced exports. All of the coefficlents were significant and there
was no autocorrelation.

Chemica1 Products

EK坦白

log X t = 12.6313 + 0.0639 logFDl t_1 + 0.0062 GDP t _1
(173.352) (1. 989)
(1 .889)
+0.0578 TREND
(7 .4 30)
R 2 - adjusted = 0.8676

D 甸 w.

F

= 1. 6831

=

27.2019

S.E.

=

0.0989

The coefficient for FDI in chemical products was also positive and significan t. The only other
variable whìch yielded significant results was growth of the economy. Inclusion of all
combinations ofthe other independent variables rendered insignificant results. Thus FDI in this
sector seelned to complement exports. There was again no indication of autocorrelation.
In summary, Japan's exports to China were in f1 uenced by several factors, but in only
two sectors , food and chemical products , was FDI one of thern. Almost all of the coefficients
for the FDI variables were highly insignificant , while for a11 the other independent variables
there was strong significance at the 50/0 leve l. Thus, FDI generally had no in f1 uence on exports
and there was no crowding out whatsoeve r.

Ex口ectationd旦旦d

Assessment

çfl也旦旦旦旦旦王旦chnolo 立v

T ransferal

Soon after the fall of the Gang of Four, China's new leaders began to reverse the selfreliance policies espoused by Mao Zedong. lt was realized that if the country was to modernize
it had to acquire advanced te c1mology , and that the only way to acquire this was to develop
export industries , invite foreign investors and obtain as much aid as possible. The governn1ent
had high expectations that now the door was open foreign countries would quickly come förth
with their technologies and China would soon catch up with the rest of the developed world.
Many governn1ent documents detail the urgency for and faith in the workability of technical
cooperation. Article Four of Regulations Issued by the State Council on 20 Septenlber 1983
for the Inlplementation of the Law ofthe People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint
Ventures is a good example:
"A joint venture that applies for establishment sha11 emphasize econornic results and satisfy one
or more of the following requirements:

(1) It will adopt advanced technology and equipment andωientific managerial
techniques , enabling it to increase the variety of its products , Ïn1prove their quality and
raise output , and to conserve energy and materials~
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(2) It wiU benefit the technical renovation (sic) of the venture , and achieve quick results
and large profits wÌth a small investment;
(3) It will be able to expand the export of its products and increase foreign exchange
earnings; and
(4) It wi lI be able to train technical and managerial personne 1."
lnnumerable small books and pamphlets pub1i shed by goverrun.ent bodies were aimed
at helping foreign investors learn how to become involved in China. One such publication
(Chu Baot缸， 1986 , 37-38) includes the following description:
"The Chinese side expects [investors from overseas] to transfer .. . as much advanced
technology as possible , using such technology as their investment. If they do not have
the know-how , they can contribute cash in foreign exchange as investment , which can
be used by the joint venture to pay for the advanced equipment and know-how it needs.
Bringing in advanced technology and equipment from abroad enables the joint venture
to combine the strong points of the Chinese and foreign participants and gain vantage
position in n1arket competition. But the Chinese side does not expect the foreign side
to contribute as investment things already available in China. ... From the Crunese point
of view , the investment in kind from the foreign side should preferably be specialized
equipmen t. "

Potential foreign investors in any country are motivated by a variety of factors relating
to the comparative costs of capital , labour and natural resources in the home and host countries
and the comparative size and potential spending power of the lnarkets. Specifically , on the
push side , an investor would be interested in investing abroad if resources are not available or
are costly in his own country , and/or equipment costs and wages are high , and/or the market
is lin1ited in some way. On the pull side , investors would be interested ín establishing
operations abroad if natural resources were readily available , and/or capital equipment could
be procured cheaply , \vages were low, and/or ifthe host market (or a third country's quota言 i.e. ，
using the host country to circumvent the trade barriers of another country) were very attractive.
The bottom line is that companies decide to invest abroad if they perceive they can make
substantial savings in their production costs and/or sell much greater quantities oftheir products
than they can in their home markets.
However , insofar as China is concerned , Japanese investors have not been motivated
solely by business and market forces. Sino-Japanese relations are very complex due to a
variety of historìcal and political factors. During World War II Japanese soldiers destroyed
many Chinese cities and tortured and murdered thousands of civilians. Though the atrocities
were committed over fifty years ago , on the Japanese side there remains some guilt, and on the
Chinese , a strong feeling that Japan has yet to cOlnpensate fully for the economic and social
damage wrough t. Thus it is not surprising that when the door opened, the Chinese held
especially high expectations for Japanese investment. Many Chinese complain that the Japanese
companies have not brought China their latest production techniques and are continuing to
exploit the country.
lt is virtually an impossible task to determine whether the technology given by one
country to another is modern , for "nlodern" is relative. ln the absence of cOlnprehensive and
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authoritative surveys it is possible to make only a few general observations and to consider the
results of several sma11 surveys undertaken by various analysts.
Firstly , Japanese investment in China only rea11y began in 1984. Given the very
backward state of China' s economy when the door was first opened , this is a relatively short
period of time on which to make an objective assessmen t. Secondly , it is wrong to examine
Japan' s contribution to China's modernization strictly in terms of technology. Over half of a11
official aid to China has COlTIe frOlTI Japan. In the early 1980s the Japanese Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund began to offer yen credits to China which were to be used for infrastructural
developmen t. These were the first loans that China accepted from a foreign country since the
loans from the USSR in the 1950s. The Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund is the
largest lender to China, providing mor巳 than the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.
The Export-Import Bank of Japan has also extended to China vast sums for the development
of natural resources. Interestingly , a Chinese economist who set out to determine whether or
not China has received a fair share of the world' s investment discovered that it was in fact only
Japan which seemed to contribute an "adequate" amount , while four other major source
countries , the United States , Germany , France and the United Kingdom , did not (Wei , 1995 ,
187).
Japan' s bestowal of such vast amounts of aid are certainly related to the aboven1entioned guilt factor , but it is also readily conceded in Japanese publications that such aid is
used to prepare the way for investors (Hatch , 1995 , 297). As Japan has been so heavily
involved in China' s largest infrastructure projects , some would say that Japan has had an unfair
edge because of a11 the aid. According to United States government personnel and Japanese
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund officials , hovvever , investors from other countries have
had equal opportunity to participate in these projects (Clifford , 1993 , 32).
Thirdly 型 as far as the degree of sophistication of the technology transferred to date is
concerned , Japan' s transferal of whole industrial plants has given China not only hardware but
software. Yokoi (1990 , 696) has traced the output growth of several production processes in
which the Japanese have invested and found that China's world ranking is high lTIuch in part
to Japanese efforts. "ln particular, Japan contributed to the establishrnent of China' s modern
industries , including iron and steel , electric-power generation , non-ferrous metals ,
petrochelnicals , fertilizers , synthetic fibres , electric equipment and electronics." Granted , there
were other factors at work which would have also contributed to increasing output levels , but
without doubt , Japanese money and training were pivotal. According to Campbell (1987 , 72) ,
who conducted a survey of 115 foreign con1panies in Beijing in 1985 , Japanese companies had
more employees in situ than any other country , and were given the most encouragement to
learn Chinese.

In 1986 , as a goodwill measure , the Japanese government established the Japan-China
Investment Promotion Association, and in 1990 a Chinese counterpart was founded. The author
is unable to comment upon their success , although it is known without doubt , that in the early
1980s Japan and other investing countries were greatly hampered in transferring modern
technology to China by the policies of The North Atlantic A11iance Coordinating Committee
for Export Control to Communist Areas (COCOM) whose lnandate was to prevent the spread
of strategic technology.These policies were relaxed in 19869 but thcHToshiba Case ,, inMay
1987 , in which Toshiba Machine Company was barred from selling in China for one year
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because it exported unauthorized technologies and machines , fuelled anti-Japanese sentiment.
Fourthly , as for quantities of Japanese technology , China is not the least favoured
recipien t. According to a recent report written by the Japanese Science and Technology
Agency , over the 1993/4 fiscal year , Korea had the largest number of technology imports at
104, followed by the US at 100, China at 80, Taiwan at 52 and Thailand at 32. ("Korea
Emerges as Japan's No. 1 Tech Exporting Country" , 1996). According to Yokoi (1996 , 151) 型
between 1981 and 1988 Japan supplied only 80/0 of China' s technology itnports, but in 1992
and 1993 this increased to 20-30%.
Understandably, Japanese companies have had serious concerns about transferring
technology to China. (Chinese suspicions about the low level of technology were borne out by
Campbell (1 987, 71), who points out that while, on average, 67% of the foreign companies
agreed that "a key success factor is to offer your latest technology ," and 72 0/0 of the Alnerican
firms agreed要 only 61 010 of the Japanese firms held this view). However , having few natural
resources of her own, Japan was forced to lnake exports of manufactured goods the foundation
of her economic growth strategy. Given the combination of China's low production costs,
especially labour costs , and poor record for patent and copyright protection, small Japanese
companies in particular , have feared economic collapse should China learn to produce certain
export items. Japan is not alone in her cautious approach. According to one survey , 5.8 years
elapse before multinational companies make their first transfer of technology to subsidiaries in
developed countries, 9.8 years to subsidiaries in developing countries and 13.1 years for outside
licensing agreements and joint ventures (Mansfield and Romeo , 1980).
ln some cases , Japanese companies may well have wanted to transfer higher technology ,
but were hampered by the many factors frustrating all foreign investors in China, namely , poor
infrastructure, including unreliable energy supply and transport, shortages of good quality
materials, prolonged bureaucratic wrangling, Party interference, lack of skilled Chinese labour,
lack of good interpreters, lack of a strong legal system型 tight availability of foreign exchange,
dubious accounting procedures, etc. (Whiting, 1989, 109-111 ; Macleod, 1988, 14-38; Kleinberg,
1990, 221-245.)
It is clearly evident from examining Japan's investment patterns in Asia as a whole that
reducing production costs , especially labour costs , has been a pritnary motive in choosing
location and type of production (Yoshihara, 1978; Awanohara, 1989; Tokunaga, 1992 and
Healey , 1991). Japanese companies first went to the NIES , then to four ASEAN countries
(Thailand, Malaysia, lndonesia and the Philippines), and most recently to China and Vietnam
The choice of these countries was, of course, influenced strongly by the political stability, the
incentives offered by the host country, and availability of some measure of infrastructure. It
is very likely that Japan would have begun investing earlier in China had the political
environment been better. That the growth rate of Japan' s exports to China has been slowing
down while that of FDl has been increasing would seem to support the argument that Japanese
companies are interested in using relatively cheap Chinese labour to produce Japanese products.
1t could also indicate that another key 1110tivation for Japanese investors is a growing marke t.

No statistics are available showing by sector the proportion of output from foreign
enterprises in China which has been exported. The results of a survey carried out in 1990
suggested that initially Japanese companies were most interested in producing goods for export
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from China, but later when Chinese citizens had more spending power, they changed their focus
to the host country market (Taylor , 1993 , 320. Quoting a JETRO survey) . 1n 1993 an
economist from the Nomura Research Institute, discussing the surge of Japanese Ïnvestment in
China in the 1990s , explained it is due to the perception "that the promise of China as a market
has finally turned into reality" and companies "aren't investing to export to the United States
and Europe anymore 、 but to take advantage of the local market" (Sender , 1996 , 47). A survey
of forty .T apanese companies investing in China carried out in 1995 found that the third and
fourth most important factors affecting their decision to invest in China after "political stability"
and "continuation of the open door policy" were the fflocal potential market" and "expected
growth rate of the Chinese economy and market" (Tang , 54-56).

Conclusion
The first task of this paper was to gain a better understanding of the effect of .T apanese
FD1 on .T apanese exports to China. 扎1ultiple regression analysls seclned to indicate that for
manufacturing exports as a whole between 1980 and 1994 , FD1 was not an in f1 uencing facto r.
This also was true for the textile products , electrical machinery , non-ferrous metal products ,
transportation equiprnent and general machinery sectors. 1n each case the FDI coefficient was
insignificant while varîous other variables were highly significant. The only two sectors in
which FDI did seem to in f1 uence exports were food products and chemical products. A
chronological review of the export and FDI data revealed that the trends of both were highly
erratic , due rnainly to political factors in China, but that generally speaking , the growth rate of
exports to China was decreasing , while the annual growth rate of FDI was increasing.
The second purpose of this paper was , in the context of Japanese FDI , to comment on
Chinese expectations for and assessment of Japanese technology transferaL Many Chinese
people believe that .T apanese companies have not been providing their most efficient
technologies. This is backed up by the Campbell Survey (1987). Evidence, however多 from
several other researchers seems to indicate that Japan' s investment has had a strong positive
effect on rals1ng output levels of many products , and that the nUlnber of technologies
transferred from Japan to China is relatively high. Most countries do not transfer technology
to other countries soon after it has been brought into use in the home country. Japan is not
unique in this respec t.
Having little in the way of natural resources , Japan has based her success on the
manufacturing of goods for expor t. Logically, Japanese companies would not undermine their
own survival by sharing new technologies indiscriminately \vith other countries, particularly one
possessing a combination of low production costs, especially low labour costs, and a reputation
for poor patent protection.
By way of tying the two parts of the paper together , the findings in the tìrst part that
export growth to China has been declining while FD1 growth has been rising , and that in most
sectors FDI did not in f1 uence , let alone stimulate exports , could suggest that Japanese
cOill_panies have in recent years been manufacturing more in China than in Japan , and
concomitantly, bringing more technology into China. The fact that lTIOre Japanese-supervised
production is occurring in China can only mean that China wi lI benefit fronl lllore and a wider
variety of Japanese technology and expertise.
16

References
Awanohara, Susumu. (1989) ~吵。n 's Growing External Assets - A Medium for Regional
Growth? Hong Kong: Lingnan College , Centre for A:弓ian Pacific Studies.
Campbell , Nige l. (1987) "Japanese Business Strategy in China," Long
69-73.

R αnge

Planning 20 (5)

Chenery , Hollis B. (1 960) "Patterns of 1ndustrial Growth ," American Economic Review 50
(September) 624-654.
Clifford , Bil l. (1 993) ".Tapan' s Lending Program in China," The China Business Review
June) , 30-35.

(May冒

Chu Baotai. (1986) j-"oreign Investment in China: Questions and Answers. Beijing; Foreign
Languages Press.
Hatch , Walte r. (1 995) "Vietnam' s Place in Japan ' s Regional I-Ii gh Technology Production
Alliance." 1n Duffield , Barbara, ed. Japanese Investment and Aid Strategies in Vietnam.
Implications for Development Directions. Victoria, B.C.: Centre for Asia Pacific 1nitiatives,
University of Victoria.
Healey , Derek. (1 991) Japanese Capital Exports and Asian Economic Development. Paris:
OECD.
Howe , Christopher. (1990) "China, Japan and Economíc Interdependence in the Asia Pacific
Region , The China Quarterly 124 (December) 662呵 693.
Hymer , S.H. (1976) The
Press.

Internαtional

Operations ofNational Firms. C aIubridge , MA.: M1T

Japan External Trade Organization (1E TRO) (1 994) "Japan's Direct Foreign Investment
Continues to Fall ," Tradescope (April).
Kinoshita , Toshihiko. (1995) Japαn 's Direct lnvestment in Ch iJ的 - Current Situation , Prospects
and Problems. Unpublished repor t. Tokyo: Export-1mport Bank of Japan. Research 1nstitute
for 1nternational Investment and Development.
Kleinberg , Robert. (1 990) China 's "Opening" to the Outside World. Boulder: \tVestview.
Kojima , K. (1 973) "A Macroeconomic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment," Hitotsubashi
Journal of Economics 14 , 1-2 1. Quoted by Healey , Derek. (1991) Japanese Capital Exports
and Asian Economic Development. Paris: OECD.
- ( 1978) Direct Foreign Investment: A Japanese Model of Multinational Business
Operations. New York: Praege r.

17

"Korea Emerges as Japan's No.l Tech Exporting Country ," Korea Herald January 12 , 1996.
Linnemann, Hans. (1 966) An Econometric Study ofTrade Flows. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Lipsey, R.E. and M.Y. Weiss (1 981). "Foreign Production and Exports in Manufacturing
lndustries," The Review of Economics and Statistics 63 , 488-494.
(1984) "Foreign Production and Exports of lndividual Firms ," The Review of
Economics and Statistics 66, 304-308.
.

Macleod, Roderick. (1988) China Inc. , How to Do Business with the Chinese.
Bantam.

Toronto:

Mansfield, E. and Romeo, A. (1 980) "Technology Transfer to Overseas Subsidiaries by U.S.
Based Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 95 , 737-750 quoted by Byun Hyung-Yoon and
Wang Yunjong. (1 995) "Technology Transfer and l\1ultinational Corporations: The Case of
South Korea," Journal of Asian Economics 6 (2) (Summer) 203.
Ono , Shuichi. (1 992) Sino-Japanese Economic Relationships: Trade , Direct Jnvestment, and
Future Strategy. World Bank Discussion Papers, China and Mongolia Department Series.
Wa :s hington.
Ozawa, T. (1979) Multinationalism Japanese Style. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sender 言 Henny.

(1996) "Japan Inc. Let Me Introduce You" Far Eastern Economic Review

(1 February) 51
Sumitomo Life Insurance Research Institute. (1989) "Wagakuni no Kaigaichotusetsutoshi no
Shinten to Sono Boekishushi ni Oyobosu Eikyo" (Development of DFI of our Country and its
In1pact on Balance of Trade) Cited in Ono , S. (1992).
Tang Chi Hong. (1995) "A Study and Analysis of Japanese Investment in China: the Factors
In f1 uencing Japanese Firms' Attitudes and Motivations," Unpublished Directed Research Project雪
Lingnan College , Hong Kong.
Taylor, R .I .D. (1993) "Japanese Investment Strategy and Management Training in China:
Lessons for British Investors," Asian AjJairs 24, 315-326.
Tokunaga, Shojiro. ed (1 992) Japan 's Foreign Investment
lnterdependence . Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press , 1992.

and Asian

Economic

Wei Shang-Jin. (1 995) "Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: Has China Reached its
Potential? ," China Economic Review 6 (2) 187-199
Wh iting , Allen S. (1 989) China Eyes Japan. Berkeley: University of California.

Yokoi , Yoichi. (1 990) "Plant and Technology Contracts and the Changing Pattern of Economic

18

1nterdependence between China and Japan ," The China Quarterly 124 , 694-713.

- (1 996) "Major Deve10pments in Japan-China Economic 1nterdependence in 19901994." 111 Howe , Christopher , ed. China and Japan - History, Trends , and Prospects , Oxford:
Clare11don , 147-713.
Yoshihara, Kunio. (1978) Japanese lnvestment in Southeast
of Hawaii , 1978.

Asiα.

H01101ulu: The University

Zha11g Zhaoyong. (1995) "International Trade and Foreign Direct 1nvestment: Further Evidence
from China ," Asian Economic Journal9 (21) 153-167.

19

Research Fellows
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies

Centre for Public Policy Studies

Professor Kueh , Yak-yeow , Director

Professor Ho , Lok-sang , Director

Dr. Bridges , Brian , AEP

Dr.

Dr. Chan , Che-po , UL

Dr. Dixon, John , AEP

Dr. Cheung , Kui-yin , UL

Dr. Fan, C. Simon , UL

D i. Fan, C.

Simon言 UL

Dr. Hiroyuki , 1m缸，

ATP

Che 賢明lai-kin ，

USL

Dr. Law, Wing 去in ， Kenneth , UL
Dr. Lee , Keng-mun , William 世

AEP

M r. Kwok , Hong-kin , ATP

D r. Leung , Kit-fun , Beatrice , USL

D r. Lee , Keng-mun , William , AEP

Dr. Li , Pang-kwong , UL

Dr. Lei , Kai-cheong , UL

Dr. Newman , David , AEP

Dr. Leung , Kit -fun , Beatrice , USL

Ms.

Dr. Li , Pang-kwong , UL

Dr. Voon , Thomas , AEP

Dr. Ren , Yue , ATP

D r.

Siu世 Oi -ling ,

W剖，

A TP

Xiangdong , UL

Dr. Thomson, Elspeth , A TP
Dr. Voon , Thomas , AEP
D r. Wei , Xiangdong , UL
D r. Wong , Yiu-chung , UL

All the Research Fellows listed above are staff of Faculty of Social Sciences. Interested
staff from other academic departments of the College and other institutions are welc0 1l1e to
J01n the Centres as Research Fellows or Research Associates. Please contact D r. Brian
Bridges (Te 1. 2616 7172) for further information.
AEP = Associate Professor
ATP = Assistant Professor
USL= University Senior Lecturer
UL = University Lecturer

Working Paper Series
No.

豆豆豆

Author

1 (1193)

Growth into a market economy:
The "Incremental Approach" in China

Dr. Fan Gang

2 (2/93)

中國第 一部證券法起草中的若干問題

厲以寧教授

3 (3/93)

Social Inequality in Singapore:
A Dual Economy Approach

Dr. William K.M. Lee

4 (4/93)

European Monetary Integration:
Experiences and Future Prospects

Professor Dieter Cassel
and Dr. Thomas Apolte

5 (5/93)

Whither Hong Kong in an Open-Door ,
Reforming Chinese Economy?
(Published in The Pacific Review (London)
Vo l. 6 No .4, Dec 1993 , pp. 333 -351

M r. Y.P. Ho
and Professor Y. Y. Kueh

6 (6/93)

China's Rise , Russia's Fall:
Policy Choice or System Difference

Dr. Peter Nolan

7 (7/93)

Economic Integration Within Greater
China: Trade and Investment Flows
Between Mainland Chi na書 Hong Kong
and Taiwan
(Published in The China Quarterly No.
Dec 1993 , pp. 771-745)

Dr. Robert F. Ash
and Professor Y.Y. Kueh

136 雪

8 (1194)

North Korean Nuclear Weapons Policy:
An Expected Utility Analysis

Dr. David Newman
and Dr. Brian Bridges

9 (2/94)

Economic Reforms and Inequality
in China

Dr. Joseph C.H. Chai
and Ms. B. Karin Chai

10(3/94)

Industrial Deregulation and
Economic Restructuring in China:
A GATT Perspective

Professor Y.Y. Kueh

11 (4/94)

The Political Development of China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong Since the Late
1970s: Problems and Prospects

Mr. Yiu-chung Wong

12 (5/94)

Decreasing Cost and Profit Maximization
in Cournot Duopoly Models

Dr. Kai -cheong Lei

No.

Topic

Author

13 (6/94) CAPS

Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese
Enterprise Licensing

Dr.

Economics as a Conceptual Resource for the
Study of Public Management

Professor David L. Weimer
and Professor Aidan R. Vining

的 (8/94 )CAPS

The Fifth Dragon: Aspects of the Economic
Take-off in Guangdong Province, China

Professor Y. Y. Kueh

16 (l /9 5)CAPS

Kim 10ng-il and the Future ofNorth Korea

D r. Brian Bridges

17 (2/95)CPPS

Mandatory Occupational Retirement Savings:
Towards a Program Design Agenda for Hong
Kong

M r. 10hn Dixon

18 (3/95)CAPS

Ideological Congruence in the Chinese
Countryside: Village Leaders and their
Electorates and Selectorates

D r.

19 (4/95)CPPS

The Road to China: Hong Kong's Transition to
Chinese Sovereignty

D r. David N ewman

20 (5/95)CAPS

The Division of Labor , Product Quality , and the
Pattern & the Dynamic Effect of International
Trade

D r. C. Simon Fan

(6月 5)CPPS

Reducing Moral Hazard in Deposit lnsurance: A
Policy Instrument for Generating Regulatory
Jnformation

Dr. C. Simon Fan

22 (7/95)CPPS

Occupational Stress 3lnong Schoolteachers: A
Revievv' ofResearch Findings Relevant to Policy
Fonnation

Ms. Oi-ling Siu

23 (8 /95)CPPS

A Model of Intergenerational Transfers Based
on "Evolutionary" A1truisn1

Dr. C. Simon Fan

24 (9/95)C PPS

lnitial HUlnan Capital Distribution and Long
Run Income Distribution

Dr. C. Simon Fan

25 (1 0/95)CAPS

Growth-In f1 ation Tradeoff in China

Dr. Hiroyuki lmai

26 (11 /95)CPPS

Managerialism-solnething 01d , Something
Borrowed , Something N ew: Making
Governn1ent More Business-like

Dr. 101m Dixon

14

21

(7月 4 )CPPS

Melanie 扎lanion

Melanie 扎1anion

No.

豆豆豆

Author

27 (1 2/95)CPPS

Congestion Pricing and Public Transport

D r. Lok -sang Ho and
M r. Wing-chung Pun

(1 3 月 5)CAPS

China's Foreign Policy in the Mid-1990s

Professor Joseph Yu-shek C

29 (1 /96)CAPS

Explaining China's Business Cy c1 es

Dr. Hiroyuki lmai

30 (2/96)CPPS

Stress at Work雪 Coping ， and Workers' Health of
an Acquired Firnl in Hong Kong

Ms. Oi-ling Siu

31 (3/96)CPPS

A Universal Fully-funded Pension Scheme

D r. Lok-sang Ho

32 (4/96)CPPS

Commercialising Government: A Challenging
Agenda

D r. John Dixon

33 (5/96)CAPS

China' s Road to Exchange Rate Liberalisation

DJ\ Lok-sang Ho

(6月 6)CAPS

The Role of Hong Kong in Sino-US Economic
Relations

Professor Y.Y. Kueh
and Dr. Thomas V oon

35 (7/96)CAPS

Export Competitiveness of China and ASEAN
in the US Market

Dr. Thomas Voon

36 (8/96)CPPS

lnstitutional Foundations for a Just Society

Dr. Lok-sang Ho

37 (9/96)CPPS

Piece Rate Payment Schemes and the
Elnployment of Women: Thc Case of Hong
Kong

Professor John S. Heywood
and D r. Xiangdong Wei

38 (1 0/96)CPPS

Public Policy on Local Administration in Hong
Kong: Past , Present and Future

D r. Yiu-chung Wong

39 (11196)CPPS

Occupational Stress Among Factory Workers in
Hong Kong and China: A Comparison Study

恥1s .

40 (12/96)CPPS

V/age Subsidies as a Labour Market Policy Tool

D r. Lok-sang Ho

41 (l 3/96)CAPS

Political Pragmatism on the Chinese Canlpus
since 1989

Dr. Che-po Chan

42 (14/96)CPPS

Delayed Compensation and the Hiring of Older
Workers: Evidence from Hong Kong

Professor John S. Heywood
D r. Lok -sang Ho
Dr. Xiangdong Wei

43 (l 5/96)CAPS

lnlpacts of Foreign Policies on the Gains from
Research and ProlTIotion

Dr. Thomas Voon

28

34

Oi-ling Siu

No.

豆豆豆

Author

44 (16/96)CPPS

Hedonic Pricing for Prawn and Shrimp in the
Philippines

Dr. Thomas Voon

45 (1/97) CAPS

China and the Prospects for Economic
Integration within APEC

Professor Y. Y. Kueh

CAPS

Export Competition .Among China and ASEAN
in the US Market: Application of Market Share
Models

D r. Thonlas J. V oon
Dr. Xiangdong Wei

47 (3/97) CAPS

Hong Kong' s Outward Processing Investment in
China: It s Implications on Hong Kong Economy

Dr. Kui-yin Cheung

48 (4/97) CAPS

China - Taiwan' s Trade and Investment
Relations and their Impact on Taiwan's Income
Distribution

Dr. K. C. Lei

49 (5/97) CAPS

Overseas Chinese and F oreign Investment in
China: An Application of the Transaction Cost
Approach

Dr. C. Simon Fan

Japanese FDI , Exports and Technology Transfer
to China

Dr. EIspeth Thomson

46

50

(2月 7)

(6月 7)

CAPS

Lingnan College Library
All R.q9~s on loan are subject
to recall after 2 weeks
Date Due 到期單

~ ' :' Ij ~(}~仰
~- "'2

9﹒ 旺C 泣。06
...- ~.，...

@ 帥酬謝
@
~9. J.O

叫叫 RU
洲11
和
且
1
，叫恥恥恥圳A

附州州州川FD
白
M闡
m明叫闡明U
E
用圳川川川q
川u

6

QU
u川
u洞叫叫神

前闡明
M間

LMmfhEF

4LHHUHHHHHHH
可Han-

S
吼叫州州
•••••••

••••••••••

M 州州
3

mm叫咱叫咱4EE
隨隨叫咱

且可

』HHHHMMMMMMHHNUNa-BE

G 圳州州州州州 FL
M間川川川川川川川川川川、‘'，

AH
圳圳叫叫川川川圳圳
!叫
l【
UH

NE--

